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This paper examines the parallel discourses of ‘lost’ local flood expertise and the growing use of commercial
consultancies to outsource aspects of flood risk work. We critically examine the various claims and counter-claims
about lost, local and external expertise in flood management, focusing on the aftermath of the 2007 floods in East
Yorkshire, England. Drawing on interviews with consultants, drainage engineers and others, we caution against
claims that privilege ‘local’ floods knowledge as ‘good’ and expert knowledge as somehow suspect. This paper
urges carefulness in interpreting claims about local knowledge, arguing that it is important always to think instead
of hybrid knowledge formations. We conclude by arguing that experiments in the co-production of flood risk
knowledge need to be seen as part of a spectrum of ways for producing shared knowledge.
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Introduction
The farmers will tell you that the Environment Agency men
on the ground, the people who are actually responsible for
operating the pumping stations – they know what is required
to be done. And they make dark noises about people sitting
in offices with computer models, not knowing what the hell
is going on. (Interview, rural group 1)
Much of England was affected by flooding during
the summer of 2007. Heavy rainfall in May, June and
July produced some of the highest monthly averages
ever recorded. Of particular concern was the surface
water flooding that affected large areas of East
Yorkshire. This region contained good river and coastal
flood protection but, as the events of 2007 revealed,
there was insufficient drainage capacity to deal with
surface water from heavy rainfall on such a scale. In the
city of Hull over 8600 homes were flooded and more
than 20 000 residents affected (Coulthard and Frostick
2010; Walker et al. 2011). A further 6000 households
were flooded in the surrounding East Yorkshire local
authority area (East Riding of Yorkshire Council 2008).
In terms of the flood’s impact, this was the UK’s largest
surface water flooding event on record.
Reports were commissioned at both local (e.g.
Coulthard et al. 2007; East Riding of Yorkshire Council
2008) and national levels (Pitt 2008). Among the
concerns expressed in these reports was the need to
make better use of local expertise. In particular this
concern focused on claims that the impact of the
flooding was exacerbated by the loss of engineers on
the ground with high levels of relevant local knowledge
and experience. These post-flood inquiries showed that
since the privatisation of the water industry in 1989
many local authorities had shed or not replaced retiring
drainage engineers, suggesting a loss of local expertise
and accumulated historical knowledge about how local
drainage systems operated. This lost knowledge
included the location and capacity of some of the
underground sewers and culverts, as well as known
trouble spots and pinch-points in the drainage system.
While some detailed local knowledge remained in
records, often it was partial, personal and not widely
shared among the various flood protection agencies
that formed post-privatisation. In the case of Hull and
East Yorkshire for instance, it emerged that there was
no comprehensive, accurate and up-to-date map of the
area’s drainage network. The implications of this were
profound. During the Hull flood inquiry, retired
engineers argued that this lost knowledge meant that
actions that could have been taken during the 2007
floods were not, or were taken later than they might
have been (Coulthard et al. 2007; Coulthard and
Frostick 2010).
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Set up as a rhetorical counterfoil was the often
expressed view that the loss of local expertise had been
paralleled by the growing tendency of key agencies in the
sector to outsource their work to specialist national and
international environmental consultancies. These con-
sultancies have become increasingly involved in produc-
ing complex numerical flood risk models, site surveys,
project design and constructing flood protection works
(Landstr€om et al. 2011b). The use of consultants also
emerged as a source of discontent following the 2007
floods, as they were said to be expensive and less
knowledgeable than local experts (Yorkshire Post 2010).
Influenced by recommendations made in the 2008
Pitt Report and the need to meet the requirements of
the recently introduced European flooding directive, a
new Flood and Water Management Act came into force
in 2010. The Act provided improved clarity over
responsibilities for flooding issues and strengthened
systems for coordination across relevant flood-related
agencies. Local authorities were formally designated as
the lead authorities for overseeing the flood policy
work of local partners. Recognising the skills gaps at
the local level, recommendation 19 of the Pitt Report
promoted auditing and strengthening technical training
for drainage engineers. A series of measures were
introduced to improve training for those already within
the system and to provide graduate training schemes
for new entrants (DEFRA 2012, 20).
In the winter of 2013–2014, the Somerset Levels in
England experienced a prolonged flood event, quickly
turning into a major national media event. The
Somerset Levels cover a large area of flat, reclaimed
agricultural land heavily dependent on a system of
pumped drainage channels dating mainly from the mid-
nineteenth century. Similar to the 2007 floods in East
Yorkshire, a narrative emerged contrasting local and
expert knowledge, as local farmers and residents
argued that the floods had been made worse by a
reduced drain clearance regime imposed by national
agencies (Haughton et al. 2014; Rose 2014). The Prime
Minister was drawn into what quickly became a high-
profile media debate, promising to instigate a new
programme of drain clearance, despite the considered
view of the Environment Agency and other experts that
this would have only limited impact (Fitzpatrick 2014).
The minister responsible for coordinating government
actions went on TV to argue that the government had
been wrong to listen to ‘so-called experts’. Dutch
drainage engineers were summoned to meet govern-
ment ministers about what should be done, fuelling the
notion that there was something lacking in British
expertise (Carrington 2014; Haughton et al. 2014).
Disputes about local, lay, expert and international
sources of expertise quickly began to play out in the
media, in turn influencing national policy. In covering
science controversies the news media typically try to
identify alternative views in a quest for balance in their
coverage, a practice that has been criticised for produc-
ing indirect bias when different views are presented as
having equal validity (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). In the
case of the Somerset Levels flooding, one consequence
was a ‘dumbing-down of the debate on . . . flood risk
management to a binary choice of “to dredge or not to
dredge”’ (Fitzpatrick 2014), reflecting long-standing
concerns that the tendency to privilege local knowledge
over expert knowledge can lead to poor policy (Lidskog
2008). This recent episode demonstrates how accounts
of local and expert knowledge being in conflict persist in
flood discourse in England, influencing policy at both
local and national level.
The problematic nature of binary accounts of
‘universal’ scientific knowledge and local lay knowledge
is used byLane et al. (2011) to help situate the innovative
nature of their own engagement with new ways of co-
producing flood risk knowledge in Pickering, North
Yorkshire. This novel experiment in bringing together
expert and lay knowledge to produce an novel interven-
tion is at the leading edge of co-producing flood
knowledge. But as this paper reveals, there are other
methods in circulation for producing shared flood
knowledge, accelerated by the recommendations of the
Pitt Report. This has led to a situation where hybrid
knowledge production practices have fast become per-
vasive on the ground, yet debates about flood risk
knowledge continue to rely on tropes such as ‘local
knowledge’. In this paper we set out to unpick the
credibility of claims around different types of flood risk
knowledge and how these feed into public debates about
flood policy. In particular we focus on constructions of
local knowledge, lost knowledge and different types of
scientific knowledge, and how the selective deployment
of such terms came to be used to privilege certain types of
knowledge over others, sometimes in quite problematic
ways.
The research team was interdisciplinary, comprising
a human geographer/planner, a historian and a physical
geographer, who between them conducted all the
interviews. All three authors were involved in the
post-floods policy work in East Yorkshire, two serving
on the Hull independent review of floods and two
serving on the advisory committee overseeing work on
surface water flooding in the city. This engagement
helped in framing the initial research questions and
influenced our choice of respondents. It may also have
encouraged some of our respondents to agree to being
interviewed and to open up to us.
Interviews were undertaken between 2009 and 2013
with leading figures engaged in flood risk management,
from the national through to local scales. The 42
individuals interviewed included a minister with respon-
sibility for flood issues,Members of Parliament, national
statutory and regulatory authorities, consultants,
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drainage engineers and the insurance industry. Also
included were regional bodies, water company repre-
sentatives, local politicians and officials, community
flood groups, internal drainage boards, local media and
blue light rescue services. All the interviews were
transcribed, then analysed to identify key themes. We
also undertook archival research into the history of
flood policy in East Yorkshire. There was a clear
geographical focus on East Yorkshire, linked to the
floods there in 2007 and the changes that followed. The
two local authority areas covered, Hull and the East
Riding of Yorkshire, are among the ten local authorities
with most properties at risk of flooding in England
(Environment Agency 2009).
The next section of this paper seeks to locate claims
about lost local knowledge and outsourced expertise in
relation to recent academic debates around environ-
mental controversies and the construction of local
knowledge. This is followed by an overview of the
evolution of flood risk governance and the major actors
involved. The empirical sections start by unpacking
claims about lost local knowledge and outsourced
expertise, followed by a case study of Burstwick Drain
as an example of the messy configuration of local flood
knowledge.
Knowledge controversies, credibility
claims and hybrid knowledge practices
There is a rich debate already about knowledge contro-
versies and the construction of credibility claims that
seek to privilege certain types of knowledge over others.
Such claims are often rhetorically cast by contrasting
different forms of knowledge against each other, drawing
on popular tropes and sentiments, such as distrust of
distant experts and government officials (Clark and
Murdoch 1997; Petts and Brooks 2006). This distrust
reflects a wider societal shift, with the privileged position
of the techno-rational expert being challenged, as the
selectivities involved in how scientific work is framed and
conducted are increasingly opened up to critical scrutiny
(Eden et al. 2006; Irwin 1995; Wynne 1992 1993).
There have been considerable attempts over recent
years to improve public engagement in science policy
development and to bridge the gap between expert and
lay knowledge (Lidskog 2008; Petts and Brooks 2006).
However, success has been partial, with claims that lay
and expert knowledge are in opposition still in wide
circulation. This tendency to place particular knowl-
edge forms into specific categories (e.g. local, lay,
expert, scientific) is itself problematic, since it tends to
reify particular forms of knowledge, which are then
presented as having qualities that are somehow fixed,
certain and worth privileging (Clark and Murdoch
1997). There is a fundamental problem here that these
labels can be misleading: local or lay experts may also
be technical experts for instance (Petts and Brooks
2006). But there are dangers too that those dismissing
particular forms of knowledge as somehow less reliable
or valuable miss out on the insights that come from
such sources. Until quite recently, for instance, official
agencies tended to be dismissive of local flood infor-
mation and knowledge (Brown and Damery 2002).
One explanation for such stand-offs is that profes-
sional experts and lay interest groups may be using
fundamentally different knowledge frames, drawing on
different types of information (e.g. Irwin 1995; Wynne
1992 1993). A well-known example revealed how
Cumbrian farmers and external experts saw the prob-
lems of radiation fallout post-Chernobyl in very differ-
ent ways, requiring an analytical focus sensitive towards
these different knowledge framings (Wynne 1992). Of
particular relevance to the subject of this paper has
been work on the different understandings of nature–
human relationships and the consequent differing
preferred approaches to wetland conservation of farm-
ers and conservationist bodies (Burgess et al. 2000;
Clark and Murdoch 1997).
This emerging body of work has helped move our
understanding beyond early accounts of local knowl-
edge, which sometimes presented a romanticised view
of the role of communities in creating and stewarding
situated knowledge, while tending to present an over-
simplified version of state knowledge as its antithetical
opposite, a form of remote, expert knowledge that
overrides local knowledge (Robbins 2000). Taking issue
with such accounts, Robbins (2000, 142) argues that it
is more productive to see the state as a ‘fractured
knowledge production machine’ that participates in
alliances on the ground rather than a monolithic entity
that imposes its will on others. This perspective usefully
signals the need for a better understanding of how
expert and lay knowledge intersect in concrete contexts,
challenging accounts constructed around false binaries
and an incomplete appreciation of the complexity of
knowledge formation practices.
The dynamic nature of knowledge formation prac-
tices is strongly evident in English flood risk manage-
ment, which until recently remained a largely science-
driven policy arena drawing on expertise in the various
regulatory agencies, particularly the Environment
Agency, local government, the academic community
and increasingly commercial consultancies. Attempts to
engage with local communities have only gained
substantial momentum in the past decade or so, as a
result of official reports into major flood events calling
on officials to work better with local people, for
instance assisting high-risk communities to improve
their preparedness (Brown and Damery 2002; Butler
and Pigeon 2011; Johnson et al. 2005).
Local flood knowledge is not simply the preserve of
communities and lay people, however: it can also be
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found in different professions operating at the local
level. It is important to note that the construction of
particular types of scientific knowledge as ‘local’ is
different to how local knowledge is normally portrayed
in academic debates, where ‘local knowledge’ is typi-
cally attributed to lay experts, such as farmers and
residents (Irwin 1995; Wynne 1993). This distinction
between local and remote practices of scientific
knowledge proved to be an important aspect of the
knowledge claims made in flood risk debates.
Claims about ‘local’ scientific knowledge reflected
tensions around different types of flood risk science, in
particular the way in which the former pivotal position of
drainageengineers hasbeenchallenged in recent years by
the rise of numericalmodelling. Flood riskmodelling has
become increasingly important to policymakers, gener-
ating detailed forecasts that can predict with increasing
accuracy the probability of inundation and the likely
magnitude of floods (Porter and Demeritt 2012). White
(2013) usefully charts how such knowledge is still fast
evolving, with earlier models leading to what he refers to
as an era of false precision in flood prediction, as
demonstrated by rapidly escalating official estimates of
properties at risk from surface water flooding over the
pastdecadeinresponsetogrowingawarenessofthis issue.
Recent years have seen a series of attempts to improve
the interaction of the scientists involved in flood risk
work and the communities they serve, initially mainly to
improve communication. More recently, however, there
has been a more fundamental shift towards recognising
that some of the historic gaps in flood risk information
might be filled by asking communities for their input (see
for instance the Environment Agency-sponsored work
on the Lower Severn; http://www2.glos.ac.uk/severnflo-
ods/MajorFloods.htm). In addition there have been
attempts to achieve a better integration of scientific
knowledge with local knowledge and expertise. This has
resulted in some high-profile attempts to co-produce
flood risk knowledge (Landstr€om et al. 2011a; Lane
et al. 2011; Odoni and Lane 2010; Ryedale Flood
Research Group 2008; Whatmore 2013). It is also
increasingly common practice for expert technical
reports to draw on local expertise in various ways, from
sourcing data to checking facts and interpretation
(Landstr€om et al. 2011b; Wilby and Keenan 2012).
These recent moves towards sharing knowledge are
important advances in flood risk management, which at
one level would appear to meet calls for the develop-
ment of hybrid knowledges (Clark and Murdoch 1997).
However, as the events in East Yorkshire in the 2007
and the 2014 flood events in Somerset both revealed, in
times of crisis public debate and media coverage of
flooding remains shaped by powerful claims to privi-
leged knowledge.
In conclusion, this research addresses three ques-
tions. What factors led to a claimed loss of local flood
risk expertise and the growing outsourcing of design
and technical expertise to commercial consultancy
companies? How are notions of local and expert
knowledge being defined and circulated within flood
risk management debates as a result of this process?
And finally, how have local actors responded to reports
calling on them to share their knowledge more openly?
Fragmented flood risk governance
There have been significant changes to the governance of
flood policy over the past three decades (e.g. Butler and
Pigeon 2011; Johnson et al. 2005), aspects of which are
briefly outlined here. Working alongside regional water
authorities, local authorities remained important agents
inmaintaining local drainage systemsuntil the late 1980s,
with many having expansive drainage departments
involved in direct works – sometimes also working under
contract to regional water authorities. Internal Drainage
Boards play a crucial role in agricultural drainage in
lowland areas, operating on local taxes and precepts on
landowners (Bankoff 2013). There are currently around
120 Internal Drainage Boards in England, covering 9.7
per cent of the most flood-prone land area of England
(Association of Drainage Authorities 2013). A rich web
of local and regional knowledge grew around the
resulting flood defence and drainage systems, vested
particularly in the regional water authorities, local
governments and the Internal Drainage Boards.
In 1989 the regional water authorities responsible
for providing clean water and sewerage provision were
privatised. In addition to responsibility for providing
clean water to homes and businesses, the new private
companies were given responsibility for much of the
drain and sewerage network, while the regulatory
functions of the former regional water authorities were
separated out and given to independent regulatory
bodies (Haughton 1998).
Responsibility for environmental regulation became
primarily the responsibility of the National Rivers Author-
ity (later restructured to become theEnvironmentAgency)
and the Drinking Water Inspectorate. The Environment
Agency is now the national lead agency for floods policy
and also has responsibility for flood work on coasts and
Critical Ordinary Watercourses, covering main rivers and
main agricultural drains. The Office for Water Regulation
(OFWAT) was created to provide economic regulation of
the water companies. This regulatory oversight covers
flooding related to sewage systems, including these systems
becoming surcharged or full beyond capacity.
A combination of local government restructuring
since the 1970s and water industry privatisation meant
that local authorities gradually lost many of their
statutory drainage responsibilities, albeit retaining
responsibilities for highway drainage and for local
waterways not overseen by the Environment Agency. A
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certain level of drainage engineering expertise was
required to ensure that planning and building work
approvals included appropriate network connections.
Nevertheless, many local authorities began to reduce
dramatically their specialist staff working on drainage
issues. By 2007 many local authorities, including Hull,
no longer had a specific drainage section or even a
single post dedicated to drainage and flooding issues.
Some of the work such as cleaning road gullies was put
out to tender, in line with the New Public Management
philosophy of the 1980s and 1990s, which encouraged
local authorities to contract out for much of their
delivery work. However, the picture was hugely vari-
able, with some authorities managing to find ways of
continuing to support in-house expertise.
The regional water boards and later the privatised
water companies recruited some of the former local
authority engineers, while also buying-in specialist
expertise from consultancies, particularly for numerical
modelling. The Environment Agency also began to
transform its working practices from the 1990s, increas-
ingly drawing on sub-contracted expertise from univer-
sities and international consultancy bodies. In the case
of building flood defences, this was an extension of
existing practices, while the rise of sub-contracted work
on numerical modelling reflected changing government
policy to provide probability-based flood risk maps for
decisionmakers and the public (Landstr€om et al. 2011b;
Porter and Demeritt 2012).
It should be added here that outsourcing was not new to
the water sector; private companies had often been
contracted in to build new drainage systems. However,
the scale and the extent of outsourcing increased signifi-
cantly with the restructuring that followed privatisation.
One consequence of privatisation has been increased
regulatory, public, media and political scrutiny of those
responsible for devising and implementingwater and floods
policy (Escobar and Demeritt 2014; Haughton 1998).
The Internal Drainage Boards have operated largely
outside of this framework. Though happy to contract out
aspects of their maintenance work to local contractors,
Internal Drainage Boards were the one part of the
system not radically overhauled in recent years. While
they undoubtedly faced pressure to achieve greater
efficiencies and have accordingly responded through
mergers, alliances and the pooling of expensive equip-
ment, they appear to have retained much of their
distinctive, locally rooted ways of operating. This was
to prove a key source of tension following the 2007
floods, when Internal Drainage Boards were upheld by
local communities and somepoliticians as repositories of
historically embedded knowledge involving tried and
tested practices, while the Environment Agency was
criticised for reducing its drainage engineer capacity
while becoming increasingly reliant on outsourcing work
to consultancies. A frequent concern in rural communi-
ties, evident in 2007 in East Yorkshire and again in 2014
in Somerset, was that the new waterway maintenance
regime instituted by the Environment Agency to help
protect wildlife habitats typically involved less frequent
cleaning of rivers and agricultural drains, which some
locals felt increased flood risk (Rose 2014).
In search of lost local knowledge
For the majority of those we interviewed, there was a
definite feeling that local drainage engineer capacity had
been lost and that this was to the detriment of the system
as a whole, in terms of both flood preparedness and
response. This ‘old school’ techno-scientific form of
expertise was valued on two counts. First for its ground-
ing in local drainage networks, linked to on-the-job
training that saw knowledge passed across generations;
and, second, for the more stable and holistic working
practices that had once prevailed, especially compared
with the current ‘projectmanagement’approach involving
external consultants sometimes lacking experience in the
field. One interviewee succinctly outlined the difference:
A lot of local authorities and a lot of people at the
Environment Agency now employ engineers who have very
limited practical experience of actually building things. They
can fill in forms and they can tell you what the catchment
area of a particular watercourse is. But what happens is they
then hand it over to a consultant engineer for design.
I spent from 1972–1986 as a site engineer basically, initially
designing and building, but latterly building flood defence
schemes, outfalls at pumping stations, those sorts of things
. . . When I started at the Rivers Authority, we had our own
men, our own plans, and basically as an engineer, I was in
charge of the site . . . It’s not like that anymore; it’s all
contract workers, outside consultants, designing the scheme.
(Interview: retired drainage engineer)
While engaging and mobilising community capacity
is now often recognised as an important factor in flood
risk policy, less attention has been paid to the extent
that regional water utilities and municipal government
are also repositories of local knowledge. We identify
two ways in which this institutional knowledge exists
and circulates. First, in the form of the records and
maps stored (or lost) in the recesses of archives; and,
second, in the experience and conversations of former
and present employees.
The loss of a detailed record of local drainage
systems was often presented as particularly problem-
atic. In the 2007 Hull and East Yorkshire floods,
different bodies (Environment Agency, water utility
and Local Authorities) were responsible for different
parts of the flood and drainage network (Coulthard
et al. 2007; Coulthard and Frostick 2010). Sometimes
organisations simply refused to share their records; on
other occasions, it was more a matter of not passing
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over records when responsibilities changed between
institutions. We were told, too, that records were often
destroyed when local authorities moved office or when
their changed responsibilities meant they could no
longer justify storing old paper files in scarce office
space. There were also suspicions that some retiring
engineers treated their records more as personal
property and took them with them when they left.
The interviews also revealed that the loss of local
knowledge was not simply a recent phenomenon, with
gaps in local records long-standing due to very patchy
approaches to record keeping and filing. In many
offices, it appears there was no explicit requirement for
maintaining detailed records, updated and shared
across individuals or departments even within the same
organisation. As a few interviewees noted, sometimes
this situation arose from individuals attempting to
retain power, as well as a lack of time or incentive to
record data. Particularly when concerns about redun-
dancy were in the air, rightly or wrongly, knowledge
might have been seen as a source of power and not
necessarily shared readily or unconditionally.
Attempts were made to address this problem in the
early 2000s when the government asked local actors to
come together to create multi-agency flood plans for
their areas. A regulator involved in one of the first of
these plans provided a detailed account of how he and
his colleagues in some of the other agencies decided to
create more detailed permanent records at that time:
So really, going back to that multi-agency plan . . . we said
‘look, let’s download our brains, let’s get as much captured’.
And people said ‘why are you doing this – I don’t need this’.
But what we were doing was actually downloading people’s
brains for the future generations– thatwas oneof the concepts
that we were trying to tackle. You know, get it on paper – it
might seem stupid to somebodywhohas beenworking on it for
40 years, but at least it’s there for future generations . . . From
my point of view, I downloaded all the bits I knew about the
flood defences. If this overtopped, this could happen. It could
overtop, it could breach – and if it could, what were the
consequences? That sort of basic stuff – it was all very simple
stuff. Andwhatwas the risk of it happening?Was it high risk or
was it low risk? (Interview Regulator 6)
More coordinated attempts to codify historical and
contemporary knowledge emerged from this period. It
is also worth noting that while some drainage engineers
did indeed retire and take with them their knowledge
and in some cases their records, others simply moved to
other jobs within the flood policy community. Intervie-
wees sometimes noted that they and others may have
left a local authority, for instance, only to be employed
later in other parts of the network – the water
authorities or the Environment Agency or consultan-
cies. Sometimes, however, individuals did move area or
sector with a consequent loss of their ‘local’ knowledge,
at least for a while, but this was not to say it would not
reappear at some later point in time enriched by the
experience of working elsewhere.
In fact, not everyone was convinced by the argu-
ments that local expertise had been lost to calamitous
effect, with several of our interviewees arguing that
local drainage engineers continued to be locally
important, employed within the water company, the
Environment Agency and, of course, Internal Drainage
Boards. They may have become less numerous or less
dominant as the source of authoritative advice on flood
risk, but provided you knew where to look, it was
argued, this expertise still existed. One of those
involved in the Gold Command incident room in Hull
during the 2007 floods, for instance, told us how
impressed he and his colleagues had been by Environ-
ment Agency duty officers:
They are very experienced and their knowledge of different
levels that occur in the different drains and how long it takes
a certain amount of rainfall to reach into the drains and how
it will affect it. They relied an awful lot on historical
knowledge and it was very good. It was tremendous to see.
(Interview: Emergency services 1)
Nonetheless there was widespread acceptance that,
before the 2007 floods, information had not been
widely shared between different agencies. For some
interviewees one major cause was privatisation, with
the private water company held to be reluctant to share
its information, variously attributed to either data
confidentiality in case it was commercially valuable or
to incurring the unwanted attention of regulatory
authorities. This situation changed dramatically follow-
ing the Pitt Report, which made a series of recommen-
dations for all the key actors to develop asset registers
allied to a duty to share. These were quickly acted on,
becoming widespread practice even before the Flood
and Water Management Act (2010) was passed. As one
Environment Agency worker told us:
It’s been a partnership effect to get there – I mean some of it
has come from the Internal Drainage Boards, some of it has
come from local landowners, some of it has come from the
knowledge we have got, not just within our kind of asset
teams, management teams, but also, you know, where
Planning Applications have been submitted and large areas
have been culverted and then never documented elsewhere.
And a large part of knowledge has come from Yorkshire
Water and East Riding [local authority], so everyone
obviously has bits of records about their own kind of
sections and things like that, but there was never a joint kind
of map, mapping everything out. And that has been quite an
achievement actually. (Interview Regulator 8)
The advantages of this new approach quickly became
apparent to those involved. The detailed plotting of
individual floods on to shared GIS made identifying any
clustering of events much easier. It also encouraged the
parties involved to seek common causal factors and the
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joint resolution of any issues rather than treating each
event as an individual, one-off problem. What we begin
to see here is that while some local knowledge has been
lost, much still remains in circulation.
The arguments for and against outsourcing
expertise
Recent research has highlighted the rise of a cadre of
experts in consultancies, universities and elsewhere
who make a living by identifying best practice solutions
to particular problems and selling these around the
world (McCann and Ward 2011; Peck and Theodore
2010). In the water industry specifically, studies have
shown how the opening of water markets to interna-
tional competition has been accompanied by the rise of
experts offering their services (Haughton 2002; Larner
and Laurie 2010). Rather than simply accepting such
outsourcing as good or bad, in our interviews we sought
to encourage reflections on the merits and problems
that come when heavy reliance on outsourced expertise
becomes the norm.
For many of those involved, outsourcing was not
seen as a problem:
Consultants have always been used in the water sector. I
think there has been a time during the ‘70s and ‘80s when in-
house technical expertise peaked. What does help is that
some of the numerical modelling is difficult to resource if
you are not sufficiently sized. Some of it can get quite
complicated, so I see that as a benefit . . . We regulate on the
basis of outputs. How they deliver is not an immediate
concern to us. (Interview Regulator 1)
I don’t get any sense that the Agency is uncomfortable with
the use of consultants in the way that we do it now . . . So
there isn’t much modelling skill, it’s mostly with the
consultants. (Interview Regulator 2)
These quotes reveal how both regulatory authorities
appeared to be comfortable with outsourcing work to
consultancy companies as a broad principle.
Our interviews also revealed how some of those
most concerned about the loss of drainage expertise
and the rise of remote experts typically qualified their
comments when they were asked to set out the pros and
cons of both sets of expertise. Indeed, many of the
drainage engineers we spoke to were quite critical
about the limits of earlier approaches, which they
admitted were less good at dealing with catchment
issues and relied too heavily on assumptions about
historical patterns repeating themselves.
One of the drainage engineers we interviewed
illustrated this well by talking about the experience of
his colleagues in Carlisle:
They were showing these theoretical maps and they were
going to public meetings, and all the public, the experts, the
locals, you know, were saying ‘aye, it’ll never happen – we
have lived here 40 years, that won’t happen’. And then, lo
and behold, the 2005 flood came and . . . it virtually mirrored
the actual theoretical outline. So after that they were all ‘yes,
we believe you now – give us a flood defence, tomorrow’.
(Interview Regulator 6)
The two types of expertise increasingly emerged
from our interviews as complementary, addressing
different scales of problem. The numerical modellers
were accepted as particularly expert in catchment-level
issues, while drainage engineers remained pre-eminent
in their knowledge of the intricacies of specific drain-
age systems at the local level. The underlying concern
appeared to be that outsourced expertise is not
necessarily well-versed in local issues and that consul-
tants are typically not locally rooted, of necessity
moving on from job to job.
In November 2010 these tensions spilled into the
regional press, with the Yorkshire Post carrying a story
in which farmers and a local MP criticised the
Environment Agency for spending over £30million
since 2005 on external experts. Farmers argued that
much of this advice was freely available if the
Environment Agency had asked the local experts, the
farmers themselves. The Environment Agency repre-
sentative interviewed in the report responded sympa-
thetically, but also noted: ‘There is a big difference
between local anecdote and local data. If you are
drawing up a £10million flood defence scheme you
cannot do that on the back of anecdote – you need
more science’ (Yorkshire Post 2 November 2010). It is
noticeable here how both farmers and the Environment
Agency jockey for advantage through stressing their
claims to being identified as possessors of ‘local’
knowledge.
For routine building and maintenance work, our
interviewees generally acknowledged that the benefits
of outsourcing included cost efficiencies as contractors
could afford specialist equipment and spread the
overhead costs of this across different contracts.
But, you know, we hear of the days of when it was the Water
Board and things, and Agency yards full of machines and
people and this and that, and they don’t have . . . they are not
staffed up to the sort of levels. So that sort of service has
diminished unless it is contracted out. But on the other side,
if you look at modern management, people who specialise in
particular trades sometimes could do it more effectively and
more efficiently than doing it yourself. (Interview Infra-
structure Provider 3)
You can pull in lots of different skills which you probably
can’t afford to employ in-house because there isn’t enough
work, and you can switch on and switch off, so if work
suddenly disappears you’ve not got someone idle on your
hands. (Interview, Local Authority 4)
Consultants, many of them former engineers in the
water companies, regulatory authorities and local
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authorities, valued their ability to work creatively to
find the best solutions for their clients, building up and
sharing knowledge in-house and, through engaging with
professional bodies and conferences, putting into
practice some of the strategies referred to in the recent
policy mobilities literature (e.g. Peck and Theodore
2010). One consultant felt that competition between
different consultancies raised standards generally and
helped spread innovative ideas:
I can only talk about the engineering side of things, but I feel
as though setting competitively one consultant up against
another consultant is a good way of forcing us all to try and
do things better, to try and do things efficiently and to try to
push the game on to develop new ideas that are attractive
and represent better solutions and better value for money.
(Interview Consultant 1)
Some of our interviewees were less sanguine, how-
ever, pointing to the risk that consultants might simply
replicate approaches they had developed for other
localities without adequately sensitising them to local
conditions, or that they might build up a bank of local
knowledge only to take it with them at the end of the
contract. While some of these concerns could be met by
designing better contracts, it was acknowledged that
sometimes this was not done. In general, in local
authorities as elsewhere, there was recognition of the
balance of positives and negatives that came from work
being outsourced:
If it’s contracted out you can have a consultant that has
established themselves as an expert nationwide in producing
these documents. So they’ve got knowledge and experience
of what has worked elsewhere which they can then draw on
to assist them with doing something locally. So that’s clearly
a benefit because if you’re one local authority or two local
authorities working collectively and you only produce one of
these, you’re not going to be that great at it because it is the
first time you have done one.
. . . The one disadvantage is often they won’t understand the
issues locally . . . [therefore you need] someone in the
council that’s got that local understanding and knows
enough about the technical elements of what the piece of
work is about. (Interview Local Authority 1)
This was a recurrent theme: to work well the
contracting body had to have enough in-house exper-
tise to act as ‘an intelligent client’. Where this was
lacking there were heightened risks of consultants
producing poor quality work to a poor specification, or
of being offered ‘off-the-shelf’ advice rather than
bespoke solutions. Others, too, expressed concern
about organisations that had lost their technical exper-
tise and defaulted to being what were sometimes
dismissively referred to as ‘project managers’:
Well my experience with the Environment Agency is not
good. They are an organisation of administrators; they rely
on consultants for nearly everything. The consultant in my
opinion has a vested interest in keeping to be consulted. He
will almost ‘do as they say’ is my opinion. (Interview
Community Floods Group)
The concern that consultants would default to giving
easy answers that clients wanted to hear in order to
generate repeat business rather than challenge them
was voiced more than once. Alternatively, speaking to
consultants, they valued their independence and prided
themselves on working with clients to ensure that good
project briefs were developed before work started and
that work was then carried out to a high standard. For
those we spoke to reputation was crucial in helping to
generate repeat business.
Since even the best consultants can make mistakes,
an intelligent client was felt to be essential:
I think it leaves us vulnerable. Themajority of people who are
project managing the consultants are utterly reliant on the
skill of the consultant teams. . . . [When you have project
managers] who are generally fit, bright, but young, who don’t
have much real-world experience, not only do they not have
some of those skills, but they don’t have the skills to be able to
eyeball and spot if there is a mistake. (Interview Regulator 2)
This lack of real-world experience was addressed in
multiple ways, including employing another consul-
tancy firm to verify the work of the main consultant, or
establishing steering committees to oversee projects
that included people from partner organisations who
brought with them some of the necessary technical
expertise and local knowledge. Consultancy firms now
increasingly value and come to rely on accessing such
expertise to make sure their models better match local
reality. As one consultant told us of some work they
had recently undertaken:
What that showsup is that themodel, the assumptionsmade in
the model for those instances, weren’t right. Because [differ-
ent stakeholder representatives were] saying this doesn’t
match with what we found, which shows us that the mathe-
matical side of things there don’t tally up. . . .This is where the
experience becomes very important. (Interview Consultant 1)
There are other ways of developing stronger rela-
tionships between consultancies and those who com-
mission the work, not least the use of five-year
frameworks, used by both water companies and the
Environment Agency (Landstr€om et al. 2011b). These
frameworks create a panel of preferred contractors who
once selected can be contracted in quickly for individ-
ual projects as required. This brings a level of conti-
nuity and certainty in work for the consultancies and
allows the contracting institution to set out clear
expectations for how contractors work. As one infra-
structure provider told us:
we go through a really lengthy process to ensure that who is
on that framework are quality people, an extended arm of
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the business and drive things forward and they are specialists
in certain fields. (Interview: Infrastructure Provider 1)
The five-year time periods allow the portfolio of
contractor companies to be periodically refreshed, and
also in the case of water companies reflect the five-year
Asset Management Plan (AMP) investment cycles that
they must operate to. The AMPs are a requirement of
OFWAT, the economic regulator, keen to ensure that
investment is closelymonitored toensure there is no ‘gold-
plating’, that is unnecessarily high investments that raise
costs for consumers. For YorkshireWater the frameworks
agreement have been used to persuade contractors to
share their knowledge and innovations with each other.
We encountered another way in which flood risk
knowledge is sometimes lost or re-circulated. In con-
struction work the AMP cycle means that there is a lot
of design work in years one and two, as new projects
come on-stream, but much less in year five as work is
focused on completion and new projects have yet to be
commissioned. As a result:
you do lose a huge amount of knowledge every fifth year and
that’s one of the concerns with the whole subcontracting
model is that the people would be building up five, ten,
fifteen, twenty, thirty years knowledge actually get to four
and a half years and you struggle to try and keep it going on
because they’ll go and do something else if they can. They’ll
go and work in a different area or different type of utility . . .
Let’s not butter it up, they are being made redundant. . .
Interviewer: It’s a product of the regulatory regime really.
Yes it is, absolutely. (Consultant 2)
Contested knowledges at Burstwick Drain
Within our study area, Burstwick Drain in rural East
Yorkshire came to be a scene of conflict over flood
science and competing claims to local knowledge
between a rural community at risk and Environment
Agency officials.
Burstwick Drain was over-topped during the 2007
floods, inundating a substantial number of residential
properties in Burstwick, a village eight miles to the east
of Hull. During and immediately after the 2007 flood,
bitter recriminations emerged about the maintenance
of the open drain. For some time local farmers had
been concerned that agricultural drains in the area
were not being cleared deeply or frequently enough.
The Environment Agency in particular was blamed for
this. To some extent, this conflict can be explained in
terms of different framings of nature (Burgess et al.
2000), with the Environment Agency seen as having
gone too far to protect nature and not doing enough to
protect local communities. But the issues in Burstwick
became particularly emotionally charged because of the
experiences of those whose homes were flooded.
A number of factors helped fuel the disagreement.
Residents and farmers branded the Environment
Agency as outsiders who lacked local experience and
the consultants they hired as demonstrably wrong
despite their qualifications and their sophisticated
methods. Examples circulated that some of the Envi-
ronment Agency modelling data on topography was
inaccurate for instance. The working practices of the
Internal Drainage Boards of the area were cited as
compounding evidence that the Environment Agency
was getting things wrong. The Internal Drainage
Boards were held to be using tried and tested
techniques that were at odds with those of the
Environment Agency, but that still met the regulatory
requirements of nature protection.
In the aftermath of the floods, a community floods
group, Burstwick United, was set up that raised funds
and also lobbied hard for a new drainage maintenance
regime. Ambiguity over what constitutes local knowl-
edge took a further twist when the group decided to
commission a study by a Dutch water engineer. The
resulting report provided support for the view that part
of the problem stemmed from the Environment
Agency’s drain clearance regime. Although the com-
munity included trained engineers and local landhold-
ers who had been maintaining drains for years, it was
felt this expertise alone would not be sufficient to sway
the authorities. The choice of a consultant from the
Netherlands was deliberate; the engineer was seen to
be neutral and with experience in a country heavily
reliant on its drainage system. The report largely
confirmed the views of local residents and was publi-
cised in the local media (Hull Daily Mail 2008a 2008b).
In the context of some highly charged local politics,
the Environment Agency set out to address the
concerns of locals while not conceding that its own
models were inaccurate. The drain maintenance regime
was altered and more work undertaken. The dredging
issue continues to resonate locally (Hull Daily Mail
2011). In addition, a grant of three million pounds was
obtained for defence work, including embankments
around the worst hit area (HU12 Online 2011). Even
while welcoming this substantial investment, one of our
interviewees argued that it might have been unneces-
sary if earlier spending had focused on better mainte-
nance practices informed by local expert input.
At work here are two knowledge frameworks based
on different assumptions and different datasets. Yet
this was far from a classic local versus external expertise
dispute. Both sides of the debate ended up using
external experts and tried to argue that they were
speaking with local knowledge. The Environment
Agency outsourced its modelling work to consultants
but claimed that it also had workers in the area able to
add their local expertise. Though scarring to many of
those involved, the experience of being forced to try
In search of ‘lost’ knowledge and outsourced expertise 9
ISSN 0020-2754 Citation: 2015 doi: 10.1111/tran.12082
© 2015 The Authors. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of
Royal Geographical Society (with The Institute of British Geographers)
and reconcile their differences seems to have brought
changes to both sides of the dispute as both the
Environment Agency and the community have sought
to acknowledge and respect each other’s viewpoints
and to find areas on which they can agree rather than
simply focus on what they disagree about:
One of the biggest dangers is that you can alienate the
Environment Agency: Big problem. If they are not talking to
you then you have lost the battle. What’s the point? Just the
fact that we listen to them and we put our point across in a
reasonable manner.
Now that we have been involved in this dredging project
they have been doing, we have been fully involved . . . They
are talking to us about what they are going to do and they
have asked for help. ‘Are there any engineers out there?’
And we say ‘well there are a couple’. ‘Will anyone like to
help us?’ And we said ‘tell us what you want to do’. And we
get involved in it and just by doing that and working with
them as opposed to working against them, it’s paid in aces
you know, it’s great because people will talk to you all of a
sudden whereas before, they wouldn’t. (Interview: Local
Politician 1)
We do not seek to pass judgement on whose science
was best, or whose local knowledge was proven right or
wrong in the Burstwick dispute. Instead, the key issues
that emerged are the need to respect the different types
of expertise available rather than privileging one over
the others and the hybrid practices that lay behind
claims around ‘local knowledge’.
Conclusion
The starting point of our research was a curiosity about
portrayals of locally grounded, historically accumulated
flood expertise as good, and external flood modelling
work as being problematic, remote and out of touch.
The research quickly revealed how both these framings
performed powerful discursive work in how they
privileged certain types of knowledge over others,
playing them off against each other as binary opposites.
In some ways this reflects the dissatisfaction expressed
by Lane et al. (2011, 15) with the conventional dichot-
omy between ‘universal’ scientific knowledge and ‘local’
lay knowledge. But where Lane et al. use their critique
to develop a novel experiment in coproducing knowl-
edge, this article focuses on unpicking the malleable
and problematic nature of knowledge claims around
what constitutes ‘scientific’ and ‘local lay’ knowledge.
Our research reveals how far from being seen as
‘universal’, when it came to knowledge controversies,
scientific knowledge quickly became subject to credi-
bility claims based on hybridised categories, such as the
local expertise practised over many years by drainage
engineers, portrayed as somehow both more local and
more grounded than the rhetorical counterfoil of
‘remote experts’ based in distant offices with only
limited understanding of local conditions. In similar
vein, claims about ‘local knowledge’ concealed some
very different underlying constructions, as demon-
strated in the case of Burstwick Drain. Local knowl-
edge and expert knowledge proved to be highly
malleable concepts, appropriated for particular uses
in particular debates.
Layered over problematic constructions of certain
forms of knowledge as ‘local’ was the way in which
claims were made about ‘lost’ knowledge. The basis of
these claims lay in the fact that some institutions had
lost their drainage engineer capacity, particularly local
government, while many agencies had sought to
achieve efficiencies by outsourcing aspects of their
technical work to consultants. This fed into concerns
about the loss of drainage engineer expertise, and the
increasing reliance on complex numerical modelling to
inform flood policy. Economies of scale have meant
that modelling work has been typically bought in from
consultancies rather than hosted in local authorities or
in government agencies. This fuelled concerns that
somehow ‘local’ knowledge was being replaced by that
of remote experts, working with what Landstr€om et al.
(2011b) refer to as black box solutions, not readily
understood by those without the relevant technical
expertise. The research revealed that while there was
indeed some justification for the concerns about ‘lost’
knowledge, in practice some of the knowledge of
drainage engineers thought to have been lost was
instead relocated. It could be found in other parts of
the flood risk polity, at least temporarily, with some
former local authority drainage engineers for instance
moving to consultancies or water companies.
Our findings also revealed that, when prompted to
reflect on the relative merits of outsourced expertise,
even those most concerned about the rise of ‘remote
experts’ tended to acknowledge that there were advan-
tages to be had in using consultants, for instance in
reducing costs and bringing in new ideas. Many also
quickly acknowledged that different types of scientists
had different, often complementary skills. In short, a
more nuanced appreciation of the roles of different
types of expert emerged once we probed under the
surface of claims about lost local knowledge and its
replacement by remote experts.
The Burstwick Drain study was highly revealing of
the power plays behind hybrid knowledge formation
practices, with both sides contracting external experts
to bolster their positions. A rapprochement of sorts was
achieved at Burstwick as eventually the two sides of the
debate began to talk to each other more openly,
without either ever accepting its knowledge claims as
being a problem. At one level this might be seen as
evidence of how knowledge controversies have moved
on since Wynne (1993) proposed that public attitudes
tend to be more open in engaging with science and that
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scientists typically appear resistant to accepting public
claims of expertise. Alternatively it may be that
communities have simply anticipated which kinds of
knowledge will be accepted and treated as legitimate by
the authorities, leading them to commission indepen-
dent scientific reports. The hidden problem here is that
this may lead to policy asymmetries, with wealthier
communities best equipped to take on authorities by
commissioning their own studies.
It is important to go beyond challenging claims
about the loss of local knowledge and dependence on
external experts, to examine how knowledge claims
more generally are presented. Rather than essentialist
readings of particular forms of knowledge, it is better to
think of knowledge formation practices in which
different types of knowledge are assembled in hybrid
forms, where local, lay, professional, scientific and
other understandings are combined. The term ‘local
knowledge’ is effectively more a credibility claim rather
than a meaningful stand-alone concept. Indeed, argu-
ably there is no such thing as pure local knowledge: it
only ever exists as part of hybrid knowledge formation
practices. The search for lost local knowledge was
inevitably doomed in this respect, yet what it revealed
was the powerful and problematic discursive practices
still at work in flood policy as different actors jockey to
gain attention to their preferred forms of flood
knowledge. Flood policy consequently remains fettered
by an under-developed appreciation of how knowledge
claims are mobilised in highly partial and sometimes
emotionally charged ways.
Co-production of flood knowledge is a strong theme
in recent literature in this field (e.g. Landstr€om et al.
2011a; Lane et al. 2011), yet the findings here suggest
the need to situate these experiments involving aca-
demics, lay experts and scientists within a spectrum of
possibilities for producing hybrid knowledges. This is
becoming particularly important as joint working
arrangements to improve knowledge sharing and
knowledge generation were encouraged by the Pitt
Report, and also as successful academic experiments in
the co-production of knowledge have begun to influ-
ence policy advice (Whatmore 2013). Examples include
local partnerships working to capture and record into
GIS the flood risk information held by multiple actors,
including official bodies, and their consultants, plus
sometimes local landholders and communities. The
practices of consultants are being reshaped too, as
many realise for themselves the importance of ground-
truthing their work against the knowledge of local
actors. Simultaneously, commissioning bodies have
increasingly sought to ensure that new contracts
include provisions for sharing information and that
advisory group arrangements include a range of sources
of local expertise. These emergent practices indicate
how the co-production and sharing of flood knowledge
is becoming widespread and more diverse as a set of
practices. The policy challenge for the future is to
identify how these various arrangements progress,
which ones falter and which thrive, and most impor-
tantly, which ones result in better flood risk policy.
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